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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 




Pro se appellant Justin Everett appeals from the District Court’s order dismissing 
his case for failure to prosecute.  He also appeals numerous interlocutory orders entered 
before his case was dismissed.  For the reasons discussed below, we will affirm. 
I. 
Because we write primarily for the parties, we will recite only the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In November 2017, Everett filed an employment discrimination 
complaint against his former employer, FieldWorks, and against various individuals 
associated with FieldWorks.  In April 2019, the District Court granted in part and denied 
in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and the District Court scheduled a 
jury trial on the remaining claims for Monday, June 10, 2019.  
Everett attended pretrial conferences on May 21 and May 31, and he did not raise 
any objection to the trial date at those times.  On Friday, June 7, Everett filed a notice of 
appeal from various pretrial orders, and he filed in the District Court a motion to stay the 
proceedings.  That same day, the District Court denied the stay motion and explained that 
Everett’s failure to appear for trial would subject him to sanctions.  To ensure that Everett 
received notice of the order, the defendants—at their own expense—served Everett a 
copy at his residence on Saturday, June 8.  Everett failed to appear at trial, and the 
District Court ordered him to show cause why his case should not be dismissed for failure 




Everett primarily responded with inappropriate personal attacks against the 
District Judge.  He also explained that he needed to be at work on June 10.  On August 
22, 2019, after analyzing the factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 
F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984), the District Court entered an order dismissing the case with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute. 
II. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1  But the scope of our review is 
limited to the order of dismissal, which we review for abuse of discretion.  See Marshall 
v. Sielaff, 492 F.2d 917, 919 (3d Cir. 1974); see also Camesi v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. 
Ctr., 729 F.3d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 2013). 
III. 
 In determining whether the District Court abused its discretion in dismissing the 
case for failure to prosecute, we are guided by the factors articulated in Poulis.  These 
are: “(1) the extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 
adversary caused by the failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a 
history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or 
in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an 
 
1  The Appellees’ motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction are denied.  We construe the 
document that Everett filed on Monday, September 23, 2019, as a timely notice of appeal 
from the District Court’s August 22, 2019 order.  See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 245 
(1992); see also Revock v. Cowpet Bay W. Condo. Ass’n, 853 F.3d 96, 104 (3d Cir. 




analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim or defense.”  
Poulis, 747 F.2d at 868 (emphases removed). 
 The District Court provided a thorough analysis of the Poulis factors, which we 
will briefly summarize below, and the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that the factors favored dismissal.  Four of the factors weigh heavily in favor 
of dismissal.  Those include the first factor—the extent of Everett’s responsibility, and 
the fourth factor—whether Everett’s conduct was willful or in bad faith.  The District 
Court concluded, with record support, that Everett willfully failed to abide by explicit 
court orders directing him to appear for trial.  See Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 258–
59 (3d Cir. 2008) (explaining that a pro se litigant is “solely responsible for the progress 
of his case”).  In particular, Everett had a strategic interest in delaying the trial while he 
sought to relitigate the District Court’s pretrial orders.  The order that denied Everett’s 
last-minute stay motion warned that he would be subject to sanctions if he failed to 
appear for the trial date, which had been set for months and which Everett had not 
objected to at the recent pretrial conferences. 
 The second factor, which focuses on prejudice to the Defendants, also weighs 
against Everett.  The defendants were required to expend time and expense to prepare for 
trial, including the expense of ensuring that Everett was served with the District Court’s 
order denying his stay motion and directing him to appear for trial.  Because Everett 




fifth factor—the effectiveness of other sanctions, including monetary sanctions—weighs 
in favor of dismissal. 
We agree with the District Court’s determination that the third factor, Everett’s 
history of dilatoriness, is neutral.  While he was responsible for various delays, and his 
pleadings contained many improper attacks against the District Judge, the record does not 
establish a history of dilatory conduct.  The last factor considers whether Everett was 
likely to succeed on his claims.  We agree with the District Court’s determination that 
this factor weighs against dismissal, as Everett’s claims had sufficient merit to proceed to 
trial.  However, it is far from clear that Everett would have prevailed at trial, and we 
discern no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s conclusion that, on balance, the 
Poulis factors weigh in favor of dismissal.  See Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 
(3d Cir. 1992) (explaining that “not all of the Poulis factors need be satisfied in order to 
dismiss a complaint”). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
